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I. INTRODUCTION [Is DECONSTRUCTION ANATHEMA TO
JUDICIAL LAWMAKING?]
This Article examines the treatment of deconstruction in United
States judicial opinions.' A handful of cases have directly referred to
the French philosopher and literary theorist, Jacques Derrida.2 In
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University (1984); J.D. University of Pennsylvania School of Law (1988). I wish to thank
Professor Joan Mahoney for her invaluable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. I thank
Professor Chris Iijima for helping me to develop and clarify my argument. I am indebted to
Professor Francis J. Mootz, III, for input on a later draft. Thanks to Professor Bernard Herbert
Oxman, this draft was conceived of and begun in 1995. In addition, Nancy Hachigian and JoAnn
Spinelli made it possible for innumerable revisions to be incorporated. Invaluable research and
library support was provided by Pat Newcombe. Liliana Mateo gave me support and
encouragement for which I am forever grateful.
1. Two of the cases examined are insurance contract cases; four are statutory construction
cases. See National Org. of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); United States v.
Members of the Estate of Boothby, 16 F.3d 19 (1994); In re Hollaway, 995 F.2d 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Voluntary Hosp. of Am., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 859 F. Supp. 260 (N.D.
Tex. 1993); Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 794 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1992);
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); ACL
Tech. v. Northbrook Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206 (4th App. Div. 1993); cf.
United States v. Robinson, 958 F.2d 268, 271 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (buried in a footnote without
further explanation stands the reference to the term "legitimate fiction" and Derrida. Judges
Poole, Reinhardt and Fernandez appear to suggest that Derrida's notion of "fiction" and "law"
are closely linked, if not foundational.).
2. Jacques Derrida is a French philosopher who made a splash in the philosophical
community in 1962 with his translation of Husserl's The Origin of Geometry. This work outlined
Derrida's critical thinking currently known as post-structuralism or deconstruction. See discussion
infra Parts II and III. The first text to be translated in the United States, Structure, Sign, and
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, was delivered by Derrida at Johns Hopkins University
in 1966. His writings since then, not including speeches and interviews, have exceeded some 35
works. Works most well-known in the United States include Limited Inc abc ... , Speech and
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each of these cases, the court has rejected Derrida's philosophy,
apparently out of a fear that recognition of any legitimacy of Derrida's
thoughts would lead to the self-destruction of the legal world. These
courts have misunderstood that consideration or recognition of
Derrida's philosophy in the legal context would not unavoidably lead
to the end of all meaningful legal discourse in the United States. A
discussion of these cases will serve as a springboard for an examination
of traditional methods of legal interpretation, and how these methods
interact with deconstruction.
Derrida's philosophy, which gave rise to the philosophy known as
deconstruction, contends that in Western culture our conception of the
world depends upon a logocentric view. One of Derrida's examples of
this logocentrism involves the favoring of written communication over
verbal communication. The hallmark of Derrida is his discussion of
the internal contradictions of language which, undermine any conten-
tion that language is capable of uniform meaning.
The question of why judges are concerned with justifying or
defending their decisions from the followers of Derrida?, is posed in
this Article both generally, as a matter of legal interpretation, and
specifically, within the context of the issue(s) presented in the
examined cases. By examining the concerns articulated by the judges
in these cases and then referring back to the writings of Derrida, this
Article describes the likely outcome if Derrida's views of (legal)
interpretation are in fact applied in judicial opinion-making.
In Parts II and III, this Article introduces the reader to important
concepts in Derridean deconstruction. These concepts include notions
of "privileging," "iterability," and the "free" play of text. Derrida's
work is presented generally and is examined in light of his writings
concerning law, justice, and authority. In Part IV, this Article
Phenomena and Of Grammatology. See Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc abc ., 2 GLYPH 162 (1977)
(hereinafter Limited Inc abc]; JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON HUSSERL'S THEORY OF SIGNS (David B. Allison trans., Northwestern University
Press 1973) (1967) [hereinafter SPEECH AND PHENOMENA]; JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins University Press 1976)
(1967) [hereinafter OF GRAMMATOLOGY]. Derrida's significance in the world of philosophy,
critical theory and critical legal theory, no doubt, is connected to his use of the term "deconstruc-
tion." See discussion infra Parts II and III. Its continued viability has been unprecedented.
Deconstruction arose as a rejection of the popular philosophy of the sixties called "structuralism."
Since the introduction of deconstruction, Derrida's influence has been far and wide. See id.
Derrida continues to write, lecture and teach at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
(the School of Higher Studies in Social Science) on Paris's Left Bank. He also commutes to the
United States to teach a graduate seminar at New York University.
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demonstrates the protean nature of law3 by an examination of contract
law. Part V examines the relationship of statutory law and common
law as a doubling of the difficulties of applying law uniformly and
coherently. As this Article demonstrates, the intent of the legislative
body in enacting law is thwarted by individual judges' reading and
writing of the law in the conjugation of caselaw. Finally, this Article
demonstrates that the inherent difficulties in interpreting and applying
laws lie in the relationship between the ultimate arbiter of law and the
text of the law itself.
II. DERRIDA AND MODERN THOUGHT
Derrida has been hailed as a genius, as evidenced by the confirma-
tion in May 1992 of an honorary degree in philosophy on Derrida by
the University of Cambridge. As noted in the press,
One measure of Derrida's influence is revealed by a study of 20th-
century authors most cited by other academics. The French
philosopher, who has written some 35 works, comes in the top 20,
according to the survey by the Institute for Scientific Information,
ba[s]ed in Boston.4
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two of his most quoted works, De
La Grammatologie and L'criture et la difference, were listed as among
the top twenty most cited items.' His work has been largely influen-
tial in the fields of philosophy and literary criticism. 6 In the 1980s,
his influence expanded into legal scholarship.7 Derrida has been
considered the origin of the theory called "deconstruction." 8 Decon-
struction has been variously defined and interpreted by legal scholars.9
Derrida himself in a recent paper presented at Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, in New York, had this to say in hazarding a definition
of deconstruction: "Needless to say, one more time, deconstruction,
if there is such a thing, takes place as the experience of the impossi-
3. The historical, political, and legal context within which law is decided gives each court
decision, and indeed every term used in that court decision, a unique and idiosyncratic meaning.
In this sense law is always variable and inheres a protean nature.
4. Charles Hymas, Cambridge Dons at War over Philosopher's Degree, TIMES NEWSPAPERS
LIMITED, May 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews File.
5. See id.
6. See generally JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION (1982) (discussing Derrida's
influence).
7. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 757 (1987).
8. See PEGGY KAMUF, A DERRIDA READER BETWEEN THE BLINDS vii-viii (1991); see also
Balkin, supra note 7, at 743.
9. See infra notes 12, 14, 21, 45-47, and 49.
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ble.""' His works discuss the elusive nature of the correspondence
between language as intended and language as interpreted.1 The
signature, and the recognized brilliance of Derrida, lie in his discussion
of the contradictory quality of all meaning within any written text.
III. DERRIDA ILLREAD OR UNREAD?-THE HIERARCHICAL
OPPOSITION OF IDEAS, ITERABILITY, AND THE
FREE PLAY OF TEXT
Three prominent concepts permeate the work of Derrida-"privi-
leging," "iterability," and the "free" play of text.'2  Derridean
deconstruction involves the practice of investigating signified content
and questioning the codes inherited from ethics and politics.' 3
Derrida's project is that of explaining and identifying the hierarchical
oppositions that surround language. 4 Hierarchy and opposition in
10. Mitchell Stephens, Jacques Derrida. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, Late Edition-Final, § 6
(Magazine), at 22.
11. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 14-15.
12. For a good introduction and overview of Derrida's work, see CULLER, supra note 6;
Spivak, Translator's Preface to OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2. For an excellent presentation
of deconstruction as an interpretative strategy for lawyers see Balkin, supra note 7. But see Pierre
Schlag, "Le Hors De Texte, C'est Moi" The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruc-
tion, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1641-42 (1990) [hereinafter Politics of Form] (stating that
deconstruction is not a strategy).
Derrida's work is now largely available in English translation. JACQUES DERRIDA,
SIGNSPONGE (Richard Rand trans., Columbia University Press 1984) (1976) [hereinafter
SIGNSPONGE]; JACQUES DERRIDA, GLAS (John P. Leavey and Richard Rand trans., University
of Nebraska Press 1986) (1974) [hereinafter GLAS]; JACQUES DERRIDA, SPURS: NIETZSCHE'S
STYLES (Barbara Harlow trans., University of Chicago Press 1979); JACQUES DERRIDA,
MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (Alan Bass trans., University of Chicago Press 1982) (1972)
[hereinafter MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY]; JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS (Alan Bass trans.,
University of Chicago Press 1981) (1972) [hereinafter POSITIONS]; JACQUES DERRIDA,
DISSEMINATION (Barbara Johnson trans., University of Chicago Press 1981) (1972) [hereinafter
DISSEMINATION]; JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., University
of Chicago Press 1978) (1967) [hereinafter WRITING AND DIFFERENCE]; SPEECH AND
PHENOMENA supra note 2; OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2; Jacques Derrida, Force of Law:
The "Mystical Foundation of Authorty," 11 CARDOzO L. REV. 919 (1990) (bilingual) [hereinafter
Force of Law]; Jacques Derrida, Prijugis Devant La Loi, in LA FACULTtI DE JUGER (1986)
(French) [hereinafter Prijugis Devant La Loi]; Jacques Derrida, The Law of Genre, 7 GLYPH 202
(1980); and Derrida, Limited Inc abc, supra note 2.
Derrida's later works include: ACTS OF LITERATURE (Derek Attridge ed., Routledge 1992);
APORIAS: DYING-AWAITING (ON ANOTHER AT) THE "LIMITS OF TRUTH" (Thomas Dutoit
trans., Stanford University Press 1993) [hereinafter APORIAS]; THE GIFT OF DEATH (David
Wills trans., University of Chicago Press 1995); DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A
CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA (John B. Caputo ed., Fordhan University Press
1997).
13. See CULLER, supra note 6, at 156 (quoting Derrida).
14. In 1962, Derrida's philosophy was most tightly focused first in his student dissertation
introducing and translating Husserl's The Origin of Geometry. See Spivak, Translator's Preface to
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this context involves the recognition of the ethnocentric practice in
Western culture of positioning one concept before another, and
simultaneously giving supremacy to one concept over that which it is
not-said to be its opposite. This is closely related to Derrida's
concept of privileging. Privileging is used here to mean the favoring
of certain ideas over others. In this sense, certain ideas are secondary
to those considered to be relatively primary. An example used by
Derrida to demonstrate privileging is where writing usurps the
principal role in communication over speech."5 Writing, the represen-
tative version of the spoken or thought-of concept, now has taken over
the role of the first, primary, or preferred.
Iterability is the ability of signs to be repeated and to signify the
same meaning in different contexts, regardless of the author's intent in
using those signs. 6 Hence, iterability equals repeatability or the
property thereof.
"Play" in Derrida's philosophy refers to that uncontrollable
association or interaction between writing both physically, as in the text
on a page and the spaces between text, and temporally, as in the
temporal or linear space between the spoken word and its written
signifier.' A more comprehensive overview of these three concepts
follows.
A. Privileging
Privileging is the favoring of one concept over another. One of
the easiest ways to understand Derrida's notion of privileging is
illustrated through his example of favoring writing over speech. For
Derrida, one holds an idea and its opposite in mind simultaneous-
ly-when thinking of speech we are simultaneously thinking of what
speech is not-writing, and vice versa."8
In his works Positions and Of Grammatology, Derrida discusses the"overturning and displacement" of text by the example of the tendency
OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at ix. Since that time he has published well over 22 books,
not including uncollected essays, forewords, interviews, and other public presentations. See, e.g.,
sources cited in note 12 supra. Indeed, Derrida continues teaching and speaking throughout the
world, as well as writing. For a bibliography of Derrida's works refer to KAMUF, supra note 8,
at 601-12.
15. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 8-9; MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note
12, at 315.
16. See MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12, at 90-91; SPEECH AND PHENOMENA,
supra note 2, at 50.
17. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 56-57, 101-02; SPEECH AND PHENOMENA,
supra note 2, at 65, 81.
18. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 9.
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to favor the written word over speech.' 9 Derrida postulates that
reversing the order-that is, considering the written word as parasitic
or dependent upon the speech act-yields new insights when this
privileging of one arrangement is reversed or turned on its head. 0
Immediacy, physically and temporally, of the speaker and listener
accord speech a higher value than writing because, as Balkin so aptly
puts it, "[the] immediacy seems to guarantee the notion that in the
spoken word we know what we mean, mean what we say, say what we
mean, and know what we have said."2' Because of the physical and
temporal immediacy of speech, Derrida suggests that perhaps
"[w]riting should erase itself before the plenitude of living speech,
perfectly represented in the transparence of its notation, immediately
present for the subject who speaks it, and for the subject who receives
its meaning, content, value.122
The point made here by Derrida is that speech usually involves
the simultaneous physical presence of the speaker and the listener. To
this extent, speech should be privileged over writing because the
speaker may immediately communicate his or her intention to the
listener without the mediation of writing. Speech allows for communi-
cation through tone, inflexion of voice, and nonverbal body lan-
guage-all of which serve to impart the intention of the speaker in
what it is he or she is saying. On the other hand, a writer is limited
to the alphabetic or phonetic signifiers of language. Also, the writer,
usually, would not immediately be present to answer questions from
the reader. Thus, ambiguity and ineffectiveness of communication are
more likely with writing than with speech.
19. See POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 24-27; OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 22-27,
98.
20. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 49, 52; POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 25; see
also Balkin, supra note 7, at 747.
21. Balkin, supa note 7, at 757 (quoting Barbara Johnson in her Introduction to
DISSEMINATION, supra note 12, at viii.).
Professor Balkin's article, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, was the first article
written by an American legal scholar that set out to educate American readers as to the relation
between the French philosopher Jacques Derrida and his philosophical practices sometimes
referred to as deconstruction. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 743. Balkin's article is somewhat
controversial in that it first examines deconstruction as a viable practice, not only in philosophy
but also in law. See id. at 761-64. Secondly, Balkin created a stir in the legal community because
his thesis, roughly summed up, argues that deconstruction is not only a practice but is also an
additional instrument, technique or analytical tool to add to the arsenal of the lawyer in his everyday
practice of law. See id. at 743-44, 764-67, 786. As is discussed infra at note 45, not all scholars
of deconstruction agree that Balkin's thesis is coherent with deconstruction.
22. POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 25.
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Derrida suggests that speech, like writing, incorporates three basic
properties of signification: "(1) the substitution of the signifier for
what it signifies; (2) the mediation of the experience of the signified by
the signifier, [sic] and (3) the iterability of the signifier at different
times and in different contexts. ' 23  Like the written word, speech
stands in as signifier for a particular thought. 4 In order for speech
to be a signifier, as a sign, speech must be iterable.2 Speech must be
able to continue "speaking" long after the speaker has ceased speak-
ing. 26 Hence, writing is the introduction of a means of communicat-
ing thoughts through marks. The concept of the Derridean "sign" will
be revisited shortly. The point here is that the revelation of the
lacunae or gaps between that which text represents and that which is
represented is the glory of Derrida's work.27 Within that lacunae is
the margin of the subjective self interpreting the text itself. Where no
meaning may have been intended, the reader "rewrites" the text to
have a different meaning than that of the author. The gap in time
between the original drafting of the text and the reading of the text
allows the reader this "privilege of presence" over the text.2
Deconstruction is "a way of taking a position, "29 questioning
signified content, presumptions, and conditions of discourse, the
institutional structures that enable practices, competencies, and
performances. Deconstruction challenges existing assumptions,
conditions, and structures. Privileging is a term used specifically to
describe the favoring of one concept relative to another concept.
Deconstruction involves the temporary inversion of favored concepts,
giving transcendence to the subordinate concept. The inversion is
temporary only so that new insights may be derived.3" The (re)rever-
sal to the preexisting order may be done again for a fuller picture of
the various meanings hidden within any construct. Thus, any
hierarchical opposition may be deconstructed in this manner. In
describing, overturning, and displacing text, the aim of deconstruction
is to (re)cognize that which is familiar and textualize what was
previously marginalized. Derrida says:
23. Balkin, supra note 7, at 757-58 (citing OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 44-45, 55-
57; and Limited Inc. abc, supra note 2, at 189-90).
24. See POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 21-22.
25. See Limited Inc abc, supra note 2, at 189-90.
26. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 36-37.
27. See id. at 138.
28. See id. at 11-12.
29. CULLER, supra note 6, at 156 (quoting Derrida).
30. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 12-13.
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Of course it is not a question of resorting to the same concept of
writing and of simply inverting the dissymmetry that now has
become problematical. It is a question, rather, of producing a new
concept of writing. This concept can be called gram or diffirance.
The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals
which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element
be present in and of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the
order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a
sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply
present. This interweaving results in each "element"-phoneme or
grapheme-being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of
the other elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this
textile, is the text produced only in the transformation of another
text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system,
is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only,
everywhere, differences and traces of traces. The gram, then, is the
most general concept of semiology 3 -which thus becomes
grammatology3 2-and it covers not only the field of writing in the
restricted sense, but also the field of linguistics.
The gram as diffdrance, then, is a structure and a movement no
longer conceivable on the basis of the opposition presence/absence.
Diffirance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of
differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related
to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive
(the a of diffirance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and
passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between
the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without
which the "full" terms would not signify, would not function. It is
also the becoming-space of the spoken chain-which has been called
temporal or linear; a becoming-space which makes possible both
writing and every correspondence between speech and writing, every
passage from one to the other.33
In deconstruction, it is imperative that individuals attempt to
overcome the dominant form which governs them. Derrida believes
that each person must question the origin of that domination.34  If
31. "Semiology" is the study of "the sign and its correlates: communication and structure."
POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 17.
32. "Grammatology" is the study of the "gramme," the written mark-the name of the sign
<sous raute> under erasure. Derrida argues that grammatology is a positive science composed
of the deconstruction of the privilege of the spoken word. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note
2, at 74-87.
33. POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 26-27 (emphasis added).
34. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 179, 207, 216.
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humans are to achieve additional clarity in the variable meanings of
words, they should question what constitutes their history and what
produces transcendence itself.3" The logos of each person's existence
is reflected in his or her language. 6 Derrida argues that Western
philosophy assumes that the concept of self must precede any other
cognition.37 This solipsistic approach privileges self-identity over
difference. In other words, in order to determine self-identity, one
must first have a sense of what one is before one can say what one is
not.38 To quote Derrida, "[t]he science of linguistics determines
language-its field of objectivity-in the last instance and in the
irreducible simplicity of its essence, as the unity of the phon , the
glossa, and the logos."39  Every reading catches what other readings
have missed.40  Every reading is a true reading in this sense.4  By
overturning and displacing the original positions of the prescribed
order of text, Derrida says:
What is produced in the current trembling is a reevaluation of the
relationship between the general text and what was believed to be,
in the form of reality (history, politics, economics, sexuality, etc.),
the simple, referable exterior of language or writing, the belief that
this exterior could operate from the simple position of cause or
accident. What are apparently simply "regional" effects of this
trembling, therefore, at the same time have a nonregional opening,
destroying their own limits and tending to articulate themselves with
the general scene, but in new modes, without any pretention to
mastery.42
Derrida exalts the hidden implications or perspectives as equal in status
with the privileged or primary concept.43 In Derrida's view, this
philosophical position of preferring certain concepts over others in
order to ground one's theory privileges or elevates subject (self) over
object, one concept over another.44
35. See id. at 13-14.
36. See id. at 29.
37. Derrida's exposition of Western thought is referred to explicitly in many of his works.
See, e.g., OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 18-19 (identifies the "privilege of presence" as
central to Western Tradition). See also SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, supra note 2, at 51.
38. See POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 26.
39. OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 29.
40. See CULLER, supra note 6, at 178.
41. See id. ("[T]rue readings are only particular misreadings: misreadings whose misses have
been missed.").
42. POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 91.
43. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supa note 2, at 10.
44. 'See id. at 35-36.
1997]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 21:215
In the legal context, social norms result from the favoring or
privileging of certain human values. Inherent in any law is the desire
to promote certain human conduct. Like any system of concepts, law
can be deconstructed. Because lawyers undertake the project of
establishing principles of regulatory behavior within various areas,
whether in contract or constitutional law, law reflects social norms that
must involve privileging of particular conceptions of human behavior.
In his article, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, Balkin's
interpretation of Derrida is very "legal-friendly."45  In his own
deconstructionist's anthem, Balkin beckons all lawyers to subscribe to
his version of Derrida:
Deconstruction is not a call for us to forget about moral certainty,
but to remember aspects of human life that were pushed into the
background by the necessities of the dominant legal conception we
45. See Balkin, supra note 7. Pierre Schlag, however, vehemently and openly disagrees with
Balkin's approach to deconstruction. See Politics of Form, supra note 12, at 1641-42. Schlag's
central concern is that Balkin's account of deconstruction places the individual self at the center
(and helm) of the deployment of deconstruction. Schlag sums up his critique of Balkin's article
Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory by saying,
Balkin's article thus illustrates the way in which (despite the best and most careful"substantive" intentions) deconstruction can come to be defined and confined by an
already-in-place instrumentalist ideology-an ideology which at once depicts and
constitutes morally charged individual subjects as competent choosers of normatively
empty intellectual techniques.
Politics of Form, supra note 12, at 1641-42.
More generally, Schlag criticizes Balkin's work as paradigmatic of the critical legal studies
movement's formalization of deconstruction. This naive formulation of deconstruction misreads
Derrida, according to Schilag, because at bottom, Balkin is urging that deconstruction is just
another analytical tool, technique, method, or a type of interpretation "tum[ing] deconstruction
into precisely what it seeks to resist and displace. To transform deconstruction into a theory, etc.
is to relocate deconstruction and confine it to the already inscribed logocentric matrices of
traditional legal thought." Id. at 1656. For additional readings of Schlag and critical legal studies,
see Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37, 58
(1987) (arguing that Stanley Fish's "interpretive community" thesis lacks closure); Pierre Schlag,
Symposium Foreword: Post Modernism and Law, 62 U. COL. L. REV. 439 (1991); Pierre Schlag,
Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990); and Pierre Schlag, Pre-Figuration
and Evaluation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 965 (1992). In Writing for Judges, Schlag argues that legal
academics do not influence the decisions of judges. See Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U.
COL. L. REV. 419 (1992) [hereinafter Writing for Judges]. Judges do not have time (or interest)
in reading law review articles. Id. at 421. Concurrently, judges and legislators are becoming
increasingly less coherent in lawmaking. "Richard Posner sums up these kinds of observations
rather succinctly: the opinions of judges and the writings of legislators are, he says, 'essentially
mediocre texts."' Id. at 422 (citing David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contempo-
rary Legal Scholarship, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 209, 211-12 (1986)); Pierre Schlag, Normativity
and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 831-32 (1991) [hereinafter Normativity] (stating
that both realist and critical legal studies (cls) thinkers suffer from nihilism-fear if one questions
the orthodox form of legal thought because that "risks destabilizing our normative commitments
and the conceptual approaches that sustain them," thus leading to "jurisprudential happy-talk").
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call into question. Deconstruction is not a denial of the legitimacy
of rules and principles; it is an affirmation of human possibilities
that have been overlooked or forgotten in the privileging of
particular legal ideas.
Any social theory must emphasize some human values over
others. Such categorizing necessarily involves a privileging, which
in turn can be deconstructed. But the goal of deconstruction is not
the destruction of all possible social visions. By recalling the
elements of human life relegated to the margin in a given social
theory, deconstructive readings challenge us to remake the dominant
conceptions of our society. We can choose to accept the challenge
or not, but we will no longer cling to our social vision blindly.
[T]he deconstructionist must engage in a process of self-reflection
to determine when the insights provided by deconstruction have
produced sufficient enlightenment with respect to a view of law,
legal doctrine, or human society previously accepted as privileged,
natural, or complete. This decision is, of course, a political and
moral choice, but it is one informed by insights gained through the
activity of deconstruction itself. At the moment the choice is made,
the critical theorist is, strictly speaking, no longer a deconstruc-
tionist. However, the purposes of engaging in the deconstruction
have been served.46
In other words, Derrida urges the deconstructionist practice of
recognizing that certain concepts or approaches are favored over others.
He then urges the temporary reversal of the privileged concept to the
position of the disfavored concept. This reversal illuminates hidden
assumptions and conditions in any structure.
Balkin articulates what may very well be the fear expressed by
judges (and the legal academy), which is that Derrida is unavoidably
nihilistic because he appears to deny the existence of objective truth.
Yet Balkin appeases these naysayers by assuring them that "Derrida's
46. Balkin, supra note 7, at 763, 766. Derrida is explicitly rejected in highly "commercial"
or "nonsocial" problem cases as noted here. Consider the deconstruction of law in the areas of
race, sex, or sexual orientation. Although there is burgeoning academic scholarship in these areas,
judicial opinions squarely presented with these issues have not yet named Derrida in their
decisions. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627, 1629 (1996) (deciding the issue of
whether Colorado's Amendment 2, which prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action
designed to protect homosexuals, was in violation of the equal protection clause). Balkin
ultimately contends that deconstruction is an analytical tool for political agendas-for the left and
for the right-because this deconstructive reading of legal texts sheds light on "what is privileged
and what is excluded in legal thought." Balkin, supra note 7, at 786. An interesting example
provided by Balkin is that an economic libertarian might attack the modern welfare state by
deconstructing the false privileging of certain aspects of human nature. See id.
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own arguments subtly rely on the notion of truth."47 Balkin assures
them that what Derrida really means is that deconstruction is an
interpretive technique, method, or strategy.48 Because each person
may never overcome his or her own limited points of reference, all that
a deconstructionist may seek to achieve is to further supplement
existing (dominant) conceptual apparatus with his or her own
idiosyncratic reading and interpretation.49 Thus, Balkin declares that
"[d]econstruction awakes us from our dogmatic slumber, and reminds
us that our 'truth' is only an interpretation. 0  Deconstruction
releases or frees persons to recognize associations and meanings in text
which they may have not acknowledged at play before. Literary
theorist Jonathan Culler, in his widely known work On Deconstruc-
tion," identifies what seems to most perturb legal thinkers: that in
reading, the inversion or reversal of the dominant order will lead to
chaos.5 2 As Culler puts it,
47. Balkin, supra note 7, at 760. Canadian scholar Allan Hutchinson and U.S. Professor
Pierre Schlag have highly criticized Balkin's (and other American legal scholars') account of
Derrida as epitomizing nihilism-fear. See Politics of Form, supra note 12, at 1631, 1643 n.36
(addition in original). See also Normativity, supra note 45, at 829 n.80 ("The equation of
deconstruction with radical individual subjectivism-a conflation commonly found both within
the cls movement and in the work of its critics-is, in one sense, quite surprising. In France,
Derridean deconstruction is usually criticized, not as a celebration of unbridled individual
subjectivity, but rather on the grounds that it extinguishes or suspends the individual subject.").
See also Allan Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Destruction, 94 Yale L.J. 209,
231-32 (1984) (book review).
Mr. Hutchinson aptly describes this cooption of deconstruction in American literary
scholarship:
Unfortunately, American literary scholarship has grossly misapplied this radical
critique and blunted its critical edge.... Domesticated and neutralized,
[deconstruction] has been reduced to a tamed dogma of textual nihilism. In its
American mutant form, "unbounded free play" is premised on an unconstrained
individual-at-large who designates meaning at will, an eternal signifier. It has been
put to work within the very metaphysical process that it is intended to disrupt. In
its text-centered, abstract, and ahistorical focus, Deconstruction shares much with
the discredited New Criticism.
Id. at 231-32.
In addition, Hutchinson's insightful critique of the American representation of Derrida's free
"play" of text is contained in his acclaimed book DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD (1988). See
also A.C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1173
(1992); A.C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay on Legal Interpretation, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 541 (1989); A.C. Hutchinson, P. J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical
Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199 (1984).
48. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 744.
49. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989).
50. Balkin, supra note 7, at 761.
51. CULLER, supra note 6.
52. See id. at 179.
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Like other inversions, the reversal of relations between understand-
ing and misunderstanding disrupts a structure on which institutions
have relied. Attacks on deconstructionists and on other critics as
diverse as Bloom, Hartman, and Fish frequently emphasize that if
all reading is misreading, then the notions of meaning, value, and
authority promoted by our institutions are threatened. Each reader's
reading would be as valid or legitimate as another, and neither
teachers nor texts could preserve their wonted authority. What such
inversions do, though, is displace the question, leading one to
consider what are the processes of legitimation, validation, or
authorization that produce differences among readings and enable
one reading to expose another as a misreading. In the same way,
identification of the normal as a special case of the deviant helps one
to question the institutional forces and practices that institute the
normal by marking or excluding the deviant."
B. Iterability
Another key concept in the writings of Derrida is that of
iterability. Iterability is a word used by Derrida to indicate the
necessary predicate for written communication. Every written sign or
mark cannot be a sign unless it is repeatable and identifiable. 4 The
mark must be capable of repetition in many different contexts and
remain legible (iterable) in order to constitute communication.55 This
communication takes place regardless of "the radical absence of every
empirically determined addressee in general."56 This quality of the
possibility of being repeated, and therefore identified, enables all
writing (text) to take on a life of its own. The act of reading is
identical to the act of writing.5 8 Derrida says,
What holds for the addressee holds also, for the same reasons, for
the sender or the producer. To write is to produce a mark that will
constitute a kind of machine that is in turn productive, that my
future disappearance in principle will not prevent from functioning
and from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting.
53. Id. at 178-79.
54. See MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12, at 315. The etymology of iterable is
linked to Sanskrit: "iter, once again, comes from itara, other, in Sanskrit." Id. at 315. Derrida
plays on this double meaning. Once a mark is repeated (again) it is a copy of the original, and
a copy is never truly identical to the original. Limited Inc abc, supra note 2, at 200.
55. See MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12, at 315.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 316.
58. See id.
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For the written to be written, it must continue to "act" and to be
legible even if what is called the author of the writing no longer
answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have signed,
whether he is provisionally absent, or if he is dead, or if in general
he does not support, with his absolutely current and present
intention or attention, the plenitude of his meaning, of that very
thing which seems to be written "in his name."'
Perhaps what is most interesting or significant for the legal scholar
is not what Balkin says Derrida says and means, but rather what
Balkin says Derrida may not be saying (in the main text of his article):
"Note that I am presenting my interpretation of Derrida, which is my
own 'dangerous supplement' to his work and my own metaphor."6 °
Balkin argues that the critical shift in Derrida's philosophy occurs at
this juncture-the "signifier supplements that which it signifies."6
In a play on words, Derrida makes up a word "signsponge" to show
the inextricable link between a sign and its creator.62 The use and
abuse of language and meaning is unavoidable, according to Der-
rida:63 "This signsponge maintains the spongy character, the rather
repugnant equivocation of this language which lends itself so economi-
cally to so many possible pretenders. '"64
Every signified is actually a signifier in disguise such that the
world as we know it is only a world of representations, ad infinitum.6"
Implicit then in Derrida's philosophy is an arching toward what Balkin
calls the "Real Thing, Presence Itself."66  The Real Thing is the
ultimate because it is self-sufficient, requiring no signifier or supple-
ment.6 7 Others also argue that Derrida embraces the concept that we
all are slaves to the existing conceptual apparatus and can only
supplement these familiar notions and images.68 But, as Derrida says,
deconstruction is a general strategy only to the extent that it aims to"avoid both simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics
59. Id. at 316; see also Limited Inc abc, supra note 2, at 162.
60. Balkin, supra note 7, at 761 n.56.
61. Id. at 759; OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 144.
62. See SIGNSPONGE, supra note 12, at 100.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2; and see id. at 50.
66. Balkin, supra note 7, at 760.
67. See id. at 761.
68. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell. The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as Justice,
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047 (1990).
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and simply residing within the closed field of these oppositions, thereby
confirming it."69
Of the "mystical authority" of law, Derrida says law is one more
text that is desconstructible:
Even if the success of the performatives that found law or right (for
example, and this is more than an example, of a state as guarantor
of a right) presupposes earlier conditions and conventions (for
example in the national or international arena), the same "mystical"
limit will reappear at the supposed origin of their dominant
interpretation.
The structure I am describing here is a structure in which law
(droit) is essentially deconstructible, whether because it is founded,
constructed on interpretable and transformable textual strata (and
that is the history of law (droit), its possible and necessary transfor-
mation, sometimes its amelioration), or because its ultimate
foundation is by definition unfounded. The fact that law is
deconstructible is not bad news. We may even see in this a stroke
of luck for politics, for all historical progress.7"
Our ordering of the world in terms of "abstract right" and
morality and the application of these two in a synthesized form leads
to a privileged syllogism. In Glas, Derrida draws on Hegel to provide
an example of the process of the critical displacement of these
oppositional normative items:
Its interpretation directly engages the whole Hegelian determination
of right on one side, of politics on the other. Its place in the
system's structure and development ... is such that the displace-
ments or the disimplications of which it will be the object could not
have a simply local character.71
Analysis of contract liability and statutory construction provides
profound insight into recurring problems for the lawyer and judge in
statutory construction because these groups of cases rely so heavily on
so-called "controlling" language and the subjective intent of the author.
In statutory construction, the plain meaning of language (the statutory
word) binds because it purportedly manifests the speaker's intent.7 1
Thus, the statutory word is binding only if it can bind regardless of
the legislator's intent. The evolution of legislative law, placing prior
69. POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 41.
70. Force of Law, supra note 12, at 943, 945.
71. GLAS, supra note 12, at 4-5.
72. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 2 BENCHMARK
1, 9-10 (1986).
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versions of a statute "sous rature" ("under erasure") so that the reader
may see the language which was replaced, is reminiscent of the
Derridean and Heideggerian mark of deletion. For Derrida,
That mark of deletion is not, however, a "merely negative symbol."
That deletion is the final writing of an epoch. Under its strokes the
presence of the transcendental signified is effaced while still
remaining legible. Is effaced while still remaining legible, is
destroyed while making visible the very idea of the sign. In as
much as it de-limits onto-theology, the metaphysics of presence and
logocentrism, this last writing is also the first writing.73
Deconstruction is revolutionary because it forces us to question
what before was originary. When one asks "what is the sign," the
unavoidable response is that its formal essence is presence.74 Derrida
demonstrates this in his own writing, for example, in Of Grammatology:
One cannot get around that response, except by challenging the very
form of the question and beginning to think that the sign ie that ill-
named +hiftg, the only one, that escapes the instituting question of
philosophy: "What is .... ?""
Deconstruction aims to rise above "the logos and the related concept
of truth or the primary signified .. "76 In allowing the erasure to
remain legible, Derrida exposes his overt concern that we are in the
predicament of having to refer to the historical (and its attendant
heritage) in order to transform any system."
Derrida's notion of iterability, as is demonstrated in this Article,
is one that must be recognized if one is to rigorously interpret legal
texts. Iterability speaks of the ability to repeat or reproduce an
intended image or concept by a mark. Yet there can only be one
original of anything. The corruption of the original mark in subse-
quent copies shows how the original is unique and can never be
identically reproduced. The spongy nature of language that Derrida
refers to leads to uses and abuses of individual words. In law, the
practice of repeating words with the intent of producing an identical
signification is even more daunting given the secret nature of signs
revealed only later after a thorough investigation of the context of word
choice in legal texts. This is most evident in the interpretation of
statutory language.
73. OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 23 (citations omitted).
74. See id. at 18.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id.
77. See Spivak, Translator's Preface to OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at xvii-xviii n.13.
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C. Free Play of Text
"Play" of the text is the third key concept in Derrida's work. The
text provides the reader with a series of connections in the reader's
mind often not anticipated by the author. Derrida refers to this
unprecedented reading as the free "play" of text.78 The relationship
between these unanticipated connections and signs is critical in
Derrida.79  The essence of a sign is its ability to repeat
itself-iterability.80  But as we have seen, with each repetition of a
sign, new meanings are grafted onto that sign because the sign is used
over and over again. The sign takes on new and unexpected meanings
both contextually and extracontextually as the reader "rewrites" the
text in his mind. 1  Without context there is no text. 2  Thus, this
breaking free from the text by the sign enables the written sign or
syntagma (Derrida's word), once created by the author, to let loose
upon the world and take on a life of its own in any context in which
it is repeated.83  From the moment of creation, the text is in"play."84  The systematic "play" of text involves the interaction of
signs (words) with other contextual elements-the positioning of text
within the page or within the work itself, the correspondences or
associations of meaning formed between the words, the traces of
different meanings embedded within each word. 5 Then there are the
extra contextual correspondences of text. These refer to all elements
off the page, so to speak.86 The ecology, culture, and political
structures within which the text is read bear upon a reading of any
text, including a legal text.
78. See, e.g., WRITING AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 292 ("Play is the disruption
of presence."). See also Tympan, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12, at ix:
[The text] functions as a writing machine in which a certain number of typed and
systematically enmeshed propositions (one has to be able to recognize and isolate them)
represent the "conscious intention" of the author as a reader of his "own" text, in the
sense we speak today of a mechanical reader. Here, the lesson of the finite reader called
a philosophical author is but one piece, occasionally and incidentally interesting, of the
machine.
See also POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 27 ("Diffirance is the systematic play of differences. .
79. See infra note 80.
80. See MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12, at 317.
81. See CULLER, supra note 6, at 123-28.
82. See id.
83. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 780.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
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In the legal context, legal proceeding's goal is said to be justice.
"Justice" connotes rightfulness and not just an exercise of (judicial)
authority. If getting it "right" is the goal of the judicial process, then
it seems paramount that legal texts be treated to a rigorous reading.
Yet Derrida maintains that a positivist approach to the judicial process
is self-defeating because this approach assumes that the judge stands
always above the law.87 The law, in Derrida's writings, is as elusive
as deconstruction itself-it is the experience of the impossible."8
Derrida boldly states "[d]econstruction is justice." 9 Derrida explains,
That is the process, the judgment, processus et Urteil, the original
division of the law. The law is prohibited [divided]. But this
contradictory self-prohibition allows man to self-determine himself
"freely", although that freedom annuls itself as self-prohibition not
to reside within the law. Before the law, man is the subject of law,
as appearing before the law. Most certainly. But, before the law
because one cannot enter inside the law, one is also outside of the
law. Man is neither under the law nor inside the law. Subject of
the law: outside of the law.9"
Law (and its composite-language), consequently, is not at all concrete
or positive. On the contrary, law and language are intangible and
entirely determined by the position of the speaker or judge. If the
honest judge is then to make law, he will recognize and acknowledge
for scrutiny by others his positioning of the law-fully admitting
assumptions he has made in reaching his decision, and revealing the
ideological framework and value system that form the basis for each
step in the judging process.
Law is not self-evident, but is the result of a process of engage-
ment between the narrator, who is truly the essence of the law, and the
legal question presented. Without the judge there would be no law.
As Derrida explains, law compels an answer to the questions raised in
dispute:
87. See Prijugis Devant La Loi, supra note 12, at 120-21, 125.
88. See Mitchell Stephens, Jacques Derrida, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, Late Edition-Final,
§ 6 (Magazine).
89. Force of Law, supra note 12, at 945.
90. Translated by the author from the following text:
VoilA le procs, le jugernent, processus et Urteil, la division originaire de la loi. La loi
est interdite. Mais cette auto-interdiction contradictoire laisse lhomme s'auto-
daterminer "librement," bien que cette libert s'annule corne auto-interdiction d'entrer
dans la loi. Devant la loi, lhomme est sujet de la loi, comparaissant devant elle.
Certes. Mais, devant elle parce qu'il ne peut y entrer, il est aussi hors de la loi. I1 n'est
pas sous la loi ou dans la loi. Sujet de la loi: hors la loi.
Prijugis Devant La Loi, supra note 12, at 122.
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Law is nothing that is present; law summons in silence. Before even
moral conscience, insofar as it is similar, law compels that one
respond, she destines responsibility and protection. She sets into
motion, and the guardian of law and man, that singular couple, are
drawn by her towards her and stops them before her. She deter-
mines the being poised for death before her. Yet again a tiny
displacement and the guardian (Hiter) of the law would resemble
a guardian of the being (Hirt). I believe in the necessity of "rap-
prochement," as one says, but in that nearness, in that metonymy
perhaps (law, another name for being, being another name for law;
in both cases, the "transcendental," as says Heidegger of being)
hides and protects itself perhaps still the chasm of a difference."
The relationship between law and the judge is akin to that
between deconstruction and the practitioner of deconstruction. The
practice of deconstruction requires the engagement of the decon-
structionist in order to come into being. The law judge is both
governed by and is very close to governing law in the process of
judging. Note that law sets into motion the engagement of the judge.
The judge's response to the legal question presented, what is the law?,
is one that (law) has destined to be responsible and protective, but not
just. Justice is the experience of the impossible.
According to Derrida, the "thing" which we believe we define as
law is, like justice, indefinable.92 Law is neither "qui ou quoi" (who
or what) 93 and therefore is neither self-defining nor definable-neither
self-determined nor determinable.94 It shifts just beyond our reach
like the ever-elusive x-axis to the geometric asymptote. Within that
"intervalle"(space) between "law" and "we" as "lawmakers," lies the
self-reflexive conjugation of law.9" "Law produces itself (without
showing itself, thus without producing itself) within the space of this
91. Translated by the author from the following text:
[L]a loi n'est rien qui soit prsaent[], la loi appelle en silence. Avant mme la conscience
morale en tant que telle, elle oblige i rpondre, elle destine a la responsabilit6 et a la
garde. Elle met en mouvement et le gardien et l'homme, ce couple singulier, les attirant
vers elle et les arr&tant devant elle. Elle determine l'&re-pour-la mort devant elle.
Encore un infune d6placement et le gardien de la loi (Hater) ressemblerait au berger de
l'6tre (Hirt). Je crois A la nkcessit6 de ce "rapprochement", comme on dit, mais sous la
proximitd, sous la mdtonymie peut-6tre (la loi, un autre niom pour l'6tre, l'6tre, un autre
nom pour la loi; dans les deux cas, le "transcendant", comme dit Heidegger de l'tre)
se cache et se garde peut-6tre encore l'abime d'une diffirence.
Id. at 123-24 (emphasis added).
92. See Prijugis Devant La Loi, supra note 12, at 125.
93. See id. at 125 (trans. by author).
94. See id. at 123-24.
95. See id. at 125.
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not-knowing. '"9 We may be "lawmakers" within deconstruction, but
only to the extent that we "feign presence" of our idealized law
(justice) .97
The development of law then delineates or traces the supremacy
of one judge's views over others:
and the history of law marks the arching up toward that place over
others or toward that difference between one position and another
position."
What is law? Derrida responds:
Law is neither multiplicity nor, as one believes, the universal
generality. It is always an idiom.9
Law is nothing more than what he who dons the robes says it is:
Let us be precise. We are before this text which doesn't tell us
anything that is clear, without presenting any identifiable contents
outside of the recitation itself, rather an interminable difference until
death, which rests nonetheless rigorously intangible. Intangible: I
understand by that inaccessible to contact, impregnable, and finally
unseizable, incomprehensible, but also as well as that to which we
do not have the right to touch. It is an 'original' text, as one says:
it is forbidden or illegitimate to transform or deform it, to touch its
form. Notwithstanding the nonidentity to itself of its sense or
destination, notwithstanding its essential illegibility, its "form"
presents itself and performs itself like a sort of personal identity
having the right to absolute respect. If someone changes one of its
words, alters one of its phrases, a judge could always say that there
has been a transgression, violence, infidelity. A bad translation will
always be called up to compare before the version said to be the
original that makes reference, that is, authorized as it is by the author
or the author's rightful claimants, designated in its identity by its
title, which is its proper name in the civil state, and framed by its
first word and its last word. Whosoever could have struck a blow
to the original identity of this text could have had a comparison
made before the law. This could happen to any reader in the
presence of the text, to a critic, an editor, a translator, to the (legal)
96. Translated by the author from the following text: "La loi se produit (sans se montrer,
donc sans se produire) dans l'espace de ce non-savoir." Id.
97. See Force of Law, supra note 12, at 993.
98. Translated by the author from the following text: "et l'histoire de la loi marque le
surgissement du sur ou de la difference de la taille (Gr~ssenunterschied)." Pr~jugis Devant La Loi,
supra note 12, at 125 (emphasis on surgissement added).
99. "La loi n'est ni la multiplicit( ni, comme on croit, la g~ndralit6 universelle. C'est
toujours un idiome .. " Id. at 128. (trans. by author).
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heirs, to professors. All of them, they are thus at the same time
civil servant and farmer. From both sides of the extreme.100
In the identifying of our existing order, Derrida suggests that, in
recognizing the normative, linguistic, social, and political realm within
which we are operating, we will prevent a "self-conserving repetition"
because one's "[p]osition is already iterability."1 '1  That is, the
perspective from which one begins is nothing more than the (potential-
ly dangerous) repetition of history.
The judge then must "judge," not merely contend that she is
describing what is. The judge must take a stab at articulating what
should be, "ipokh".'12 Justice paradoxically should be aspired to as
an "aporia" rather than a projected ideal.103 The point made by
Derrida here is one made by Montaigne: "laws keep up their good
standing, not because they are just, but because they are laws: that is
the mystical foundation of their authority, they have no other. ....
Anyone who obeys them because they are just is not obeying them the
way he ought to."1 4
100. Translated by the author from the following text:
Pr~cisons. Nous sommes devant ce texte qui, ne disant rien de clair, ne prsentant
aucun contenu identifiable au-deli du r6cit mime, sinon une diffrance interminable
jusqu'i la mort, reste nanmoins rigoureusement intangible. Intangible: j'entends par
1A inaccessible au contact, imprenable et fmalement insaisissable, incomprahensible, mais
aussi bien ce i quoi nous n'avons pas le droit de toucher. C'est un texte "original",
comme on dit: il est interdit ou illgitime de le transformer ou de le d~former, de
toucher i sa forme. Malgr6 la non-identit6 i soi de son sens ou de sa destination,
malgr son illisibilit6 essentielle, sa "forme" se prdsente et se performe comme une sorte
d'identit6 personnelle ayant droit au respect absolu. Si quelqu'un y changeait un mot,
y altrait une phrase, un juge pourrait toujours dire qu'il y a eu transgression, violence,
infidiliti. Une mauvaise traduction sera toujours appele 6 comparaitre devant la version
dite originale qui fait rifirence, dit-on, autoriske qu'elle est par l'auteur ou ses ayants
droit, ddsign&e dans son identit: par son titre, qui est son nom propre d'6tat civil, et
encadr&e entre son premier et son dernier mot. Quiconque porterait atteinte A l'identit(
originale de ce texte pourrait avoir i comparaitre devant la loi. Cela peut arriver A tout
lecteur en presence du texte, au critique, a l'&liteur, au traducteur, aux h~ritiers, aux
professeurs. Tous, ils sont donc a la fois gardiens et hommes de la campagne. Des deux
c6t~s de la limite.
Id. at 128, 129 (emphasis added).
101. Force of Law, supra note 12, at 997.
102. See id. at 961 (the etymology of "ipokh " in Greek connotes a fixed, determinate
position).
103. See id. at 961, 963; see also APORIAS, supra note 12.
104. "Or les loix," he says, "se maintiennent en credit, non parce qu'elles sont justes,
mais parce qu'elles sont loix: c'est le fondement mystique de leur auctorit(, elles n'en
ont point d'autre .... Quiconque leur ob(it parce qu'elles sont justes, ne leur ob~it pas
justement par oO il doibt" (Essais III, XIII, De l'exp~rience, ed. Plaiade, p. 1203)
Force of Law, supra note 12, at 939.
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Derrida's experience of deconstruction describes a process in
which all readers engage: striving to pin down the "true" intention of
the text's author. Derrida encourages the reader to continuously
reexamine his presumptions which gloss each reading. 1 5  This
exercise is invaluable because it reveals new readings of the same text,
each a misreading because other readings are implicitly rejected. In
some ways, Derrida carries the resonance of Arthur L. Corbin's work
on the subject of language. In 1965, regarding the ambiguity of
language, Corbin wrote:
If we wish to profit by the mistakes as well as by the wisdom of the
past, it is necessary to look back over our legal history. Such a look
informs us that law never begins with a system of rules and
doctrines and principles, each (presumably) eternal, unchangeable,
perfect (and perfectly worded with one true meaning). Such a look
informs us that law is in a constant process of development and
change; that laws are put into words by men-men who are not all-
wise and capable of foresight into the distant future-and that these
words are repeated by other men for shorter or longer periods of
time, packing new meanings into the words as the exigencies of life
require, finally (after a century of confusion) abandoning them
altogether.
I shall continue to do my best to clarify the process and the
law of interpretation, of both words and acts as symbols of
expression; to demonstrate that no man can determine the meaning
of written words by merely glueing his eyes within the four corners
of a square paper; to convince that it is men who give meanings to
words and that words in themselves have no meaning; and to
demonstrate that, when a judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic
evidence on the ground that the meaning of written words is to him
plain and clear, his decision is formed by and wholly based upon the
completely extrinsic evidence of his own personal education and
experience."'
105. See POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 41-42.
106. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 163-64 (1965) (emphasis added) (adapted from 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1960)) [hereinafter Interpretation of Words]. Corbin later
suggests that "[i]t would have been far better had no such rule ever been stated." 3 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 455 (2d ed. 1960) (emphasis added).
Prior to Corbin's criticism of the parol evidence rule, in 1958, two well-known legal scholars,
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, debated whether words have a core or a fixed meaning. H.L.A.
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon Fuller,
Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) (debate, in part, over
whether a World War II truck was a "vehicle" under a statute forbidding vehicles in a park).
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Corbin's referents in discussing the meaning of language uncannily are
the same as some of those use by semioticians: words as symbols of
expression. This coincidence is too significant to ignore in light of the
overall message Corbin delivers in his article, The Interpretation of
Words. Corbin's view is that words are baggage "packed" with
meanings.'°7 Once language becomes so overpacked with meaning
that it leads to more confusion than clarity in its expression, it is
abandoned altogether.' °8  Derrida does not see the problem of
language and expression of intention as resolvable by abandoning
language, or any part of it.' 9 On the contrary, deconstruction is a
way of unpacking language and adding content to each sign.10
Arthur Corbin, H.L.A. Hart, and Lon Fuller certainly agree that
language can be ambiguous and that it can be "plain and clear.""'
Corbin argues that "relevant extrinsic evidence" adduces the contract-
ing parties' intention." 2  The implication is that justice can be
rendered by a legal interpretation and court order. In contrast, Derrida
argues that the text, once created, cannot, in good faith, ever be said
to represent that which the author intended." 3  The interaction of
the text with context nullifies any intention of the author."4 Corbin
assumes that the intention and understanding of contracting parties can
be captured in the words they each use." 5  This implies dominion
by the parties over the text. Derrida argues that we may attempt to
mark our intention, but that the text will not yield to any certain
number of meanings." 6 This difference is critical as will be seen in
the following examples of contract and codified law. Text which is
"free" from the author plays upon many meanings not anticipated by
the drafter. This phenomenon is often seen in "hard cases" of contract
law and statutory interpretation. In legal practice, the lawyer struggles
to understand and persuade his audience of sometimes seemingly
contradictory notions. The fund of meanings embedded in text,
contextually and extra-contextually, make the task of effective
communication in legal practice daunting. The "play" of text within
107. See Interpretation of Words, supra note 106, at 163.
108. See id.
109. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 2, at 56.
110. See id. at 179; SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, supra note 2, at 88-104.
111. See supra note 106.
112. See Interpretation of Words, supra note 106, at 164.
113. See POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 28.
114. See id.
115. See Interpretation of Words, supra note 106, at 164.
116. See POSITIONS, supra note 12, at 40.
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deconstruction occurs unwittingly. Recognizing this phenomenon as
relevant to the development of law is the focus of the next section of
this Article.
IV. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION-VARIABLE LAW
A. What Is a "Chicken"? The Case of Frigaliment Importing
Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp.117
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp. is an excel-
lent example of Derrida's notion of iterability at play.11 Iterability
and the uncertainty of a single meaning for a single word (at least in
the area of contract law) has been grappled with by many in the legal
community-particularly in interpreting words in a contract. In
'Frigaliment, the case turned on whether there was a single meaning for
the word "chicken."" 9
The story of Frigaliment began at the World Trade Fair in 1957
where a Czech met a New Yorker who spoke German. 2 ° They
negotiated the export of poultry from New York to Switzerland."'
Following a series of exchanged cablegrams and telephone conversa-
tions carried out predominantly in German,'22 they confirmed their
agreement (in English):
US Fresh Frozen Chicken, Grade A, Government Inspected,
Eviscerated
2 1/2 - 3 lbs. each
all chicken individually wrapped in cryovac, packed in secured fiber
cartons or wooden boxes, suitable for export
117. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 117.
120. The "story" as is told here is recounted from the published decision of the court. To
that extent, this understanding of the case is limited to the "facts found" by that court and
included in the published opinion. For a discussion of the inherent limitations imposed by
imbalances of power and knowledge, between judge and lay person or lawyer, see Clare Dalton,
An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1000, 1005 (1985) ("The
judge can often write an opinion that appears more coherent because of what he is able to leave
out. It is always possible to cast doubt on an argument by suggesting that it has been
insufficiently proven, or proven only by judicious selection of evidence."). Schlag criticizes
Dalton, like Balkin, for assuming that the deconstructionist approach of Derrida is just one more
useful "strategy" for the legal advocate. Politics of Form, supra note 12, at 1642. Dalton,
however, cites to Derrida only to quickly dispense with any further discussion of deconstruction.
See Dalton, supra, at 1007-10.
121. See Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 118.
122. Id. at 118. The court dismissed the Swiss corporation's explanation that it understood
"chicken" to mean young chicken whereas the German word, "Huhn" included both "Brathun"
(broilers) and "Suppenhuhn" (stewing chicken). Id.
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75,000 lbs. 2 1/2 - 3 lbs. $ 33.00
25,000 lbs. 1 1/2 - 2 lbs. $ 36.50
per 100 lbs. FAS New York
scheduled May 10, 1957 pursuant to the instructions from Penson
& Co., New York.123
When the shipment arrived in Switzerland, on May 28, the Swiss
corporation discovered that the cartons and bags contained 2 1/2 - 3
lbs. birds which were not young chickens suitable for broiling or
frying, but chickens or "fowl" suitable for stewing.124  Following
protests (and a second shipment stopped in transit) about the balance
of birds ordered, the Swiss corporation sued the New York sales
corporation under New York law alleging a breach of warranty and
seeking damages. 12  The opinion of the court begins with "[t]he
issue is, what is chicken?' 1 26 The answer to this question, according
to Judge Friendly, is not obvious. 127  Because "[d]ictionaries give
both meanings, as well as others not relevant here" no single meaning
of chicken is the objective meaning of chicken. 128  "Since the word
'chicken' standing alone is ambiguous, I turn first to see whether the
contract itself offers any aid to its interpretation.' ' 29 The contract as
written, however, appeared to cut both ways. Having concluded that
the word "chicken" (standing alone) was ambiguous, Judge Friendly
examined the extrinsic evidence.
The judge calculated and weighed the evidence in order to rule.
The extrinsic evidence added up as the court identified the following
six indicia of the special meaning of chicken as probative of the
relevant meaning of chicken: (1) dictionaries favored both mean-
ings; 30 (2) the word of mouth negotiations preceding the contract
also favored both meanings;' 3' (3) trade usage (at least in the United
States) largely militated in favor of the Swiss corporation's mean-
ing-young hen; 32 (4) witness for the defendant, an operator of a"chicken eviscerating plant in New Jersey" said that "[c]hicken is
everything except a goose, a duck, and a turkey";' 33 (5) the regulation
123. Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 117.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 118.
130. See Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 117.
131. See id. at 118.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 119.
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of the Department of Agriculture classified chicken as a broiler or
fryer, roaster, capon, stag, hen or stewing chicken or fowl, cock or old
rooster;'34 and (6) the conduct ("immediate and consistent protests")
of the Swiss corporation upon discovering the "fowl" advanced their
meaning. 3 ' What was the court to do? It appeared that the evi-
dence of the "objective meaning(s)" of "chicken" is evenly split. The
answer lay in the "subjective intent" of the parties. 3 6 That is the
clincher. The court persuaded itself that it could see through the
evidence to the real motive and understanding of the Swiss corporation.
Given that the then prevailing market price for broilers and fryers was
between 35 and 37 cents per pound, the court imputed knowledge to
the Swiss corporation that the New York corporation intended stewing
hens because it would expect to make a profit rather than incur a
loss. 137 Apparently as a nod of respect to the Herculean (but cryptic)
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the court begins the opinion
with these words,
Assuming that both parties were acting in good faith, the case nicely
illustrates Holmes' [sic] remark "that the making of a contract
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on
the agreement of two sets of external signs-not on the parties'
having meant the same thing but on their having said the same
thing.' 138
Here, indisputably, the parties said the same thing-"chicken."'' 9
Thus, the deployment of Holmes's "remark" in the service of
rationalizing a lack of integration in this contract contradicted Judge
Friendly's opinion. Judge Friendly justified his reasoning in a model
characteristic of traditional methods of legal interpretation. He
identified the legal rule that must control the outcome of the case,
guiding him in his objective review of the evidence. 40 Yet the
opinion reveals Judge Friendly's feelings about what he believed was
really going on between the parties. The latter reasoning drove the
former presentation. He engaged in a wide-ranging review of the
relevant community's meaning of "chicken" in order to decide the
134. See id. at 121.
135. See Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 121.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 120.
138. Id. at 117 (citations omitted).
139. Corbin engages in a fascinating explication of the text of the contract and "integration"
as a matter of contract analysis. See Interpretation of Words, supra note 106, at 166-70.
140. See Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 117.
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objective meaning of the word "chicken."' 41 Judge Friendly calculat-
ed the evidence and suspected the true intentions of each of the
parties."' Notwithstanding his caveat that he assumed that the
parties were acting in good faith, he held for the defendant because (in
the court's mind) the plaintiff appeared to be trying to bamboozle the
defendant.' The legal reason given for the holding: "For plaintiff
has the burden of showing that 'chicken' was used in the narrower
rather than in the broader sense, and this it has not sustained.' 44
If the parties' roles had been reversed-that is, if upon the
nonacceptance of the second shipment the defendant had brought an
action against the plaintiff for compensatory damages, then the burden
would have fallen on the New York seller corporation to prove that the"objective" meaning of "chicken" was stewing hen and not broiler or
fryer. How could Judge Friendly have squared the prevention of an
injustice by the purchaser, knowing that the purchaser knew that the
seller intended stewing chicken, by reference to broiler or fryer as the
objective meaning of "chicken"? As Corbin has commented on this
case, "any meaning is an objective meaning if it is given to the word
in any context by any person other than the two contracting par-
ties. 1145 The court here, one suspects, would have needed to find
that objective meaning somewhere else in the evidence in order to do"justice" to the seller.
In 1968, after the appearance of Corbin's article, Interpretation of
Words, Chief Justice Roger Traynor decided three cases which virtually
eliminated the parol evidence rule in California, Masterson v. Sine, 14 6
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W Thomas Drayage & Rigging
Co.,"' Delta Dynamics v. Arioto.48  Twenty years later, a relatively
recently appointed Ninth Circuit Judge, Alex Kozinski, by no stretch
of the imagination a judicial activist, felt bound by Traynor's precedent
cases and allowed extrinsic evidence in the historic decision Trident
Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co."49 Judge Kozinski empha-
sized that as a result of "the long shadow of uncertainty" cast by
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., California contracts were not worth the
141. See id. at 118-20.
142. See id. at 120-21.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 121.
145. Interpretation of Words, supra note 106, at 170.
146. 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
147. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
148. 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968).
149. 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
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paper on which they were written."' Judge Kozinski asked, "[I]f we
are unwilling to say that the parties, dealing face to face, can come up
with a language that binds them, how can we send anyone to jail for
violating statutes consisting of mere words ...?151
As discussed, within Derridean deconstruction, the meaning of
language involves notions of the supplement, context, and external
context. Notwithstanding Judge Friendly's apparent focus on the
intention of the parties in Frigaliment, the outcome of the case turned
not on the defendant's subjective meaning of chicken, but instead on
its "coincidence" with an "objective" meaning. Paradoxically,
Frigaliment could be argued to represent an instance of meaning being
the product of language and not, as it is usually thought of, its source.
Authorial intention in Frigaliment is less important, if important at all,
than the context in which the parties' intention was hoped to be
expressed.
In Limited Inc abc .... Derrida remarks on the statement: "I
forgot my umbrella."1 2  Derrida writes, "[a] thousand possibilitieswill always remain open. '153 As Culler notes, the possibilities of
meaning "remain open not because the reader can make the sentence
mean anything whatever but because other specifications of context or
interpretations of the 'general text' are always possible."'5 4 The next
example, the case of ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property and
Casualty Insurance Co., demonstrates this deconstructionist consider-
ation of context in practice.'55
B. What Is "Sudden"? The Case of ACL Technologies, Inc. v.
Northbrook Property and Casualty Insurance Co." 6
In ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property and Casualty
Insurance Co., the interminable quest for an objective meaning of the
phrase "sudden and accidental" in a pollution exclusion in a liability
policy was raised yet again.'57 "[D]econstructionists like Jacques
150. See Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 569.
151. 847 F.2d at 569. In her recent article, Professor Martin provides the assurance that
Judge Kozinski's fears are not warranted. See Susan J. Martin, Judge Kozinski, There Is A Parol
Evidence Rule in California - The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 SW. L.J. 1 (1995). For more
reading on the treatment of the parol evidence rule and the Trident Center decision, see A
CONTRACT ANTHOLOGY, at 313-16 (Peter Linzer, ed. 1989).
152. Limited Inc abc, supra note 2, at 201.
153. Limited Inc abc, supra note 2, at 201.
154. CULLER, supra note 6, at 131.
155. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206 (4th App. Div. 1993).
156. Id.
157. See ACL Technologies, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208.
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Derrida, contend that language is inherently equivocal .... "158 Not
so, says this court,'59 showing that it is entirely possible that judges
fear the results of such debates.
In 1984, unknown to the purchaser of some property in an
industrial section of Santa Ana, corroded underground storage tanks
contained hazardous substances which had been stored on the property
for at least twenty years6' Pollutants escaped from the tanks
through rusted holes and split seams caused by the corrosion. 6'
This court proclaimed that "sudden" can never mean "gradual" on
various grounds.162
Dealing with the "standardized" meaning of the "sudden and
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion contained in the 1973
version of the standard comprehensive general liability insurance policy
(CGL), the court affirmed the trial judgment for the insurance
company.'63 Judge Sills, writing for the court, with two concurrences
by Judges Moore and Wallin, dismissed as absurdly intellectual and
certainly not "judicially sound" any attempt to penetrate the possible
meanings in the gap between the words "sudden" and "acciden-
tal."'" Nonetheless, the court engaged in a contextual evaluation of
the words surrounding the disputed term.'65 Painstaking attention
was given to the immediate linguistic context for meaning:
The most immediate "context" for the word "sudden" is its link, in
the pollution exclusion, to the word "accidental." Plainly, for there
to be coverage (i.e., for the exclusion not to apply), the release must
be both "sudden and accidental." If, in the context of the pollution
exclusion, "sudden" meant merely "unexpected," then it would have
158. Id. at 219 n.49 (quoting Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 794 F.
Supp. 58, 60 (D.P.R. 1992)).
159. See id. at 219.
160. Id. at 208.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 208-17, 220.
163. See id. at 220.
164. See ACL Technologies, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217.
165. The court is engaging in a "textualist" approach to interpreting contract language. See
George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 327 (1995), who says:
One of the defining insights of textualism is that it directs attention to the text rather
than the text's author. To interpret is to mine the meaning of a text rather than to seek
the author's intentions lying behind the text. Between the author and interpreter there
is a distance, often historical, that cannot be breached by a claimed leap into the
author's mind. Instead, this distance is necessarily mediated by language. In this
recognition, textualism allies itself with major insights in twentieth-century hermeneutic
and Wittgensteinian philosophy.
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no independent meaning, as the idea would also be subsumed within
the word "accidental." The word would be reduced to surplusage.
Even if, for the sake of argument, there is some "abstract"
sense in which the word "sudden" does not necessarily convey a
temporal meaning, the context of its placement in the phrase"sudden and accidental" necessarily conveys a temporal meaning.
In the context of that phrase, the word must, if it is to be anything
more than a hiccup in front of the word "accidental", [sic] convey
a "temporal" meaning of immediacy, quickness, or abruptness. 166
Some reference to "external context" was provided for good
measure-Americana cartoon images were conjured to force the point
that "gradual is the opposite of sudden." The court invited readers of
the opinion to picture this:
The character Snoopy [from the comic strip, Peanuts] is sometimes
shown typing out a story beginning, "It was a dark and stormy
night. Suddenly a pirate ship appeared on the horizon .... ." In
these two sentences, "suddenly" can mean either unexpected (the
pirate ship appeared without warning) or abrupt (one moment there
was no ship, the next moment there was). However, in no reason-
able sense can Snoopy's sentence be twisted to mean "Gradually a
pirate ship appeared on the horizon."' 167
The opinion's organizing principle was the "natural" meaning ofItsudden" as "not gradual." Relying upon a full page of citations to
California cases having nothing whatsoever to do with the pollution
exclusion clause of the CGL, Judge Sills concluded that: "[w]hile we
recognize these cases do not represent the product of sustained judicial
meditation on the subtleties inherent in the word 'sudden,' [sic] they
do illustrate what the ordinary person readily knows: gradual is the
opposite of sudden.""16  More importantly, the court found little
persuasive value in the very fact that a substantial number of courts
have considered the word "sudden" ambiguous.'69
Interestingly, the court does not agree with the suggestion that
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. is an endorsement of "linguistic nihil-
ism.'"170 The court says that despite its deconstructionist dictum, the
166. ACL Technologies Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213-14.
167. Id. at 216 n.42. This author does not take issue with the court's decision. This
example however raises in my own mind the possibility that sudden may be a synonym for
gradual in the context of a sail ship appearing on the horizon.
168. Id. at 215.
169. See id. at 208-12.
170. See id. at 219.
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actual holding of Pacific Gas is very narrow, allowing extrinsic
evidence only when the parties have assigned a special meaning to a
term.' 7' On the other hand, the pollution exclusion clause is not one
of those cases-at least to this court, its language is clear and unambig-
uous. 172
The references made in these cases to Derrida expose a misappre-
hension of deconstruction. Again, deconstruction does not propose an
end to distinction in language, nor does it propose that meaning be
solely the invention of the reader. "The play of meaning is the result
of what Derrida calls 'the play of the world,' in which the general text
always provides further connections, correlations, and contexts.' 7 3
References to the text of the insurance policy, the most relevant statute,
internal structure of the policy, ordinary usage, and cultural context all
play a role in illuminating meaning of the disputed term in ACL
Technologies, Inc. This wide-ranging inquiry of the court belies its
assertion that meaning is intrinsic or "natural."
Nor does Derrida argue that communication will become
impossible or wholly subjective as maintained in the next case
examined, Voluntary Hospitals of America, Inc. v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co. '74
C. What Is "Insured?" The Case of Voluntary Hospitals of
America, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. 75
In another contract interpretation case, Voluntary Hospitals of
America, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., Judge Kendall
found no ambiguity in the term "insured" within the meaning of an
insurance contract provision containing an "insured v. insured"'76
exclusion clause:
With apologies to Derrida and de Man, the Court recognizes that an
analysis of the pertinent policy language reveals that the definition
of "insured" as applied to the insured v. insured exclusion does not
deconstruct itself into ambiguity. To read the language otherwise
171. See ACL Technologies Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219.
172. See id.
173. CULLER, supra note 6, at 134.
174. See 859 F. Supp. 260 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
175. See id.
176. An "insured v. insured" exclusion clause exonerates the insurer from payment for losses
arising from claims made by any insured under the policy against another insured. In this case,
one of the former directors of the subsidiary of the insured company assisted one of the litigants
in prosecuting a lawsuit resulting in losses to the insured company in excess of $8 million. See
id. at 261. That the director was a former director of the insured company effectively brought
into operation the "insured v. insured" exclusion clause. See id.
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would be to adopt the textual methodology of the protodeconstruc-
tionist Humpty Dumpty, for whom words meant what he wanted
them to. However the body of anti-Humpty Dumpty jurisprudence
is now well established in the courts, both state and federal, from
the Supreme court of the United States . .. to, for instance, the
courts of South Carolina.... The purpose of an insurance policy
is to insure. "Insurance policies are written by insurance companies.
Like Humpty Dumpty, they have the rare privilege of choosing
what their words mean. But, unlike Humpty Dumpty, they should
say what they mean in advance, not after the fact." In this instance,
the insurance company did say, unambiguously, what it meant in
advance.'77
If Derrida is rejected, then why the "apology"? The significance
of the judges' "apology" to Derrida could be interrupted in at least
several ways. An apology is warranted when one regrets an act.178
An apology may also be a defense. 179
In the Voluntary Hospitals of America, Inc. (VHA) case, the
plaintiff, sued the defendant insurer for reimbursement on legal costs
exceeding $8 million incurred in defending certain directors and
officers of the plaintiff's subsidiary, VHA Enterprises, in a derivative
lawsuit.' 0 The derivative lawsuit had been prosecuted with the
active assistance of Thomas Reed, a former officer and director of
VHA Enterprises.'' The policy defined "Insureds" as "any past,
present or future ... Directors or Officers of the Company [and any
Subsidiary thereof]. '"182 The insured v. insured exclusion clause in
the policy stated that "[t]he Insurer shall not be liable to make any
payment for Loss in connection with any claim or claims made against
the Directors or Officers ... which are brought by any Insured or the
Company... . "13 The insurer argued that the critical context of the
word insured, preceded by the indefinite article "any" exonerated it
from payment under the insured v. insured exclusion." 4  The
plaintiff pointed out that use of the global meaning of Insureds
177. 859 F. Supp. at 263 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
178. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 86 (1975).
179. See id. An "apologia" can also be a defense in another sense. See R.E. ALLEN,
SOCRATES AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 4 (1980). Consider the counterrhetoric of Plato's Apology.
In his ill-fated trial, Socrates was rumored to have delivered a speech which at once refutes and
agrees with his accusers. See id. at 37 (1980) (Speech reproduced).
180. See Voluntary Hosp. of Am., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 859 F. Supp. 260,
261 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. See id. at 262-63.
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(indicated by the indefinite article "any") elsewhere in the policy would
be nonsensical and result in the insurer escaping responsibility in the
policy in toto. s  The court was immovable.'86  The result of the
use of "the" in certain provisions meant that "the Insureds" referred
to in those provisions were as a matter of "plain meaning" more
specific (and narrow) than that denominated in the exclusion
clause. 187
Unfortunately, both deconstruction and Derrida in cases noted
here, have been likened to Humpty Dumpty. 88 This erroneous
characterization suggests that "deconstruction makes interpretation a
process of free association in which anything goes."' 89  Quite the
contrary is true; Derrida completely rejects this suggestion, or
"Humpty Dumpty," even as he rejects plain meaning. According to
the strategy urged by Derrida, misreadings are errors but they are also
true readings because they bear traces of the truth and catch what other
readings have missed.' 90 But the essential point of Derrida is that
words cannot mean whatever he wants them to mean. They have
multiple connections to other meanings. Words can carry the meaning
intended and thereby notify the addressee in advance of what is
intended. As has been seen, courts routinely deconstruct text in order
to investigate significations. The pertinence of the courts' writings, in
turn, lies in its ability to identify and subtend the philosophy which
supports it.
185. See Voluntary Hosp. of Am. Inc., 859 F. Supp. at 262.
186. See id. at 263.
187. See id. at 262-63.
188. See, e.g., id. at 263.
189. CULLER, supra note 6, at 110.
190. See CULLER, supra note 6, at 178.
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V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-WHO IS THE MASTER OF
INTENT, THE JUDICIARY OR CONGRESS?191
One year following his retirement from the Bench Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger wrote:
Many statutes are genuinely ambiguous, either because of imprecise
drafting or legislative compromise. Ambiguity does not, however,
make the effort to respect the division of responsibility between the
legislative and judicial branches any less important, for respect of
that division is what the Constitution itself requires."'
Undoubtedly, judges are the final canonical authority in the exegesis
of statutory authority. Experience has shown us that legislators often
do not aim to mean what judges say they meant.' 93 This "misread-
ing" places the judge in the dangerous position of (re)authoring
legislative law. In statutory interpretation, the individual judge's
subjective social and political contexts bear more weight than perhaps
anticipated by the tripartite system of government.194
191. In Lewis Carroll's, Through the Looking Glass, Humpty Dumpty in conversation with
Alice uses the word "glory" to mean "a nice knock-down argument." In response to her question
about the meaning of "glory," Humpty Dumpty responds
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 124 (Books of Wonder, William Morrow
& Co., Inc. 1993) (1872).
192. Warren E. Burger, "Foreword" to Conference on Statutory Interpretation The Role of
Legislative History in Judicial Interpretation: A Discussion Between Judge Kenneth W. Starr and
Judge Abner J. Mikva, 1987 DUKE L.J. 361 (1987).
193. Both United States Circuit Judges Kenneth W. Starr and Judge Abner J. Mikva of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have critically commented
on overreliance on legislative history.
It is well known that technocrats, lobbyists and attorneys have created a virtual
cottage industry in fashioning legislative history so that the Congress will appear to
embrace their particular view in a given statute.
Substantial monetary costs are also imposed by the accumulated masses of
legislative history produced by the Congress on any given measure.
Judge Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371,
377 (1987); Judge Abner K. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 182
(1986) ("The welter, if not to say gaggle, of statutes that currently grace the American legal
landscape has inspired a cottage industry of academic proposals for legal reform.").
Schlag, however, attacks this cottage industry on the grounds that it is simply a waste of
time. Writing for Judges, supra note 45, at 422.
194. A heated debate over the various approaches which might be adopted to deal with the
problem of statutory interpretation has ensued. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR
Judicial Deconstruction
A. Is a Houseboat a House or a Boat? The Case of United States v.
Members of the Estate of Boothby 95
In United States v. Members of the Estate of Boothby, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, reviewed the decision of District Court
Judge Jose Antonio Fuste.'96 Writing for the appeals court, Circuit
Judge Seyla succinctly sums up the issue before the court and the
conundrum the court so painstakingly sought to avoid:
Is a houseboat a house or a boat? That, in the abstract, is the
enigma posed by this case. Fortunately, we need not answer it
directly. As a court of law, we leave such metaphysical rumination
to the disciples of Jacques Derrida, and address ourselves instead to
the more tractable question of whether the Army Corps of Engi-
neers (the Corps) properly deemed two particular houseboats to be
permanently moored structures within the meaning of section 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 [hereinafter the"Act"].1 97
Why are judges afraid of "ruminating" over this question?
Would "rumination" about the meaning of "houseboat" within and
without the (con) text of the Act lead to the "ruination" of principled
reasoning?
In this statutory assessment of the meaning of "permanent
mooring structure," the court evaluated evidence suggestive of
permanence, mooring and structure: the navigability of the house-
boat. '9 The vessels had been certified as navigable by the Puerto
Rico Department of Natural Resources.'99 The vessels had been
outfitted with nautical accoutrements and occasionally raised anchor to
THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (urging that statutes be treated as common law); Abner J. Mikva,
The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography Book Review 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 544 (1982) ("The
legislative process must be reserved for elected representatives and for their constituencies.");
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (post-Chevron assessment of judicial role in lawmaking).
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 216 ("Even if
the particulars of deconstruction have nothing to contribute to law, the broader movement in
modern thought of which deconstruction is a part-poststructuralism-might have something to
contribute."). For an examination of a hermeneutical approach to statutory interpretation see Cass
R. Sunstein, Commentary on Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993); Charles W.
Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of
Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 264 (1991).
195. 16 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1994).
196. See id.
197. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 22-23.
199. See id. at 22.
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troll La Parguera Bay.200  Notwithstanding the certification, the
Circuit court found ample support in the administrative record, the
trial transcript, photographs and other documentary evidence to agree
that these vessels were not of navigable quality.20' And then, so as
to complete its legal reasoning, the court focused on the intent of the
governmental agency administering the Rivers and Harbor Act and on
the intent of the owners of the houseboats. 202
The Circuit court concluded that the houseboats were "struc-
tures"-houses.0 3  Presumably then, the court had adroitly avoided
the "abstract" exercise of deconstruction, but rather, had calculated
fairly and objectively the true and plain meaning of what was meant by"obstruction" to the navigable capacity of the waters of the United
States under the regulations. However, the court did indeed decon-
struct the term "navigability." If a houseboat is not navigable, then it
is permanently moored (and is a house and not a boat). If the
houseboat does not possess the quality of "navigability" then it is the
opposite of navigable (i.e., not navigable or of "doubtful navigabili-
ty"). 2°4 The fact that two separate entities, the Puerto Rico Depart-
ment of Natural Resources (DNR) and the Corps, concluded different-
ly as to what "navigability" was or was not, allowed the First Circuit
to find that the district court had not committed "clear error" in its
interpretation of navigability.20 5  After all, the court admitted
"[n]avigability does not have the same meaning for all purposes.
... "206 What was of paramount importance to the court is that the
motives of the houseboat owners rooted in deceit (or at least so the
record seemed to show):
the houseboats were put in place to circumvent the ban on stilt-
houses; they were primarily intended to serve as vacation homes,
pure and simple; the gadgets attached to them over time were meant
to camouflage the scheme rather than for seafaring per se; and the
occasional jaunts about the bay represented perfunctory attempts to
satisfy the terms of the statute.20 7
200. See id.
201. See Members of the Estate of Boothby, 16 F.3d at 23.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 22.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 23.
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So the court ultimately was more concerned with the houseboat
owner's intent to navigate rather than capacity to navigate. 208  After
all, if an owner does not intend to cast off, his or her "boat" can be
said to be "permanently moored" in the relevant sense, notwithstanding
the theoretical possibility that the "boat" is capable of navigation. The"relevant sense" as the court puts it lies within the intent of some
anonymous third persons who saw to it that the Rivers and Harbors
Act be "transformed into an instrument of environmental policy."209
The Act itself provides little guidance. Citations to the underly-
ing purpose of the Act are all to decisions of the Supreme Court
making vague statements such as the Act must be read "charita-
bly"'21  because "a river is a treasure." '211  We see how the First
Circuit followed the notion that the intent or purpose of the statute, as
interpreted by these judges, was the foundation from which the actual
words in the text of the statute or implementing regulations should be
read. The text must conform to the predetermined and prescribed
meaning assigned to the text by the judges. Within the margins of the
law, the judges wrote their own law, as it were, and gave supremacy to
the context of the law over the text itself.
B. Where Is Economic Motive? The Case of National Organization
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler212
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler is demonstra-
tive here of the concept of free "play" of text.213 Scheidler is one
example of how the judiciary, knowing full well the articulated intent
of Congress, has steadfastly refused to implement that intent by
judicial fiat. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, was
enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act on October
208. Under admiralty and maritime law, there is no such animal as a boat (or a houseboat
for that matter). Under the federal law, the houseboat is a vessel and is treated as a fictional
"person" much in the same sense as is a corporation a "person" under the law. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 782 (West 1997) (vessels charged with liability may be sued in the jurisdiction in which
the vessel is found). The full exercise of ascertaining the relevant intentions then would
necessarily include the intent of the vessel. Equipped with an operating motor for seaworthiness,
the vessel might very well intend to troll. But no one asked the vessel.
209. Members of the Estate of Boothby, 16 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1994).
210. See id. at 23 (citing to United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960)).
211. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
212. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
213. Id.
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15, 1970.214 The language of the statute itself is a patchwork of text
cross-referencing disparate sections, including sections of the United
States Code pertaining to various criminal acts.215 In sum, the courts
agree that the civil RICO plaintiff must allege the following (elements)
to establish a RICO claim:
(1) that a person
(2) has employed a pattern of racketeering activity or the proceeds
thereof
(3) so as to affect an interstate enterprise
(4) in one or more of the three ways prohibited under Section
1962216
(i) [by] investing the income derived from a pattern of racke-
teering in the enterprise, Section 1962(a); [or]
(ii) [by] acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering, Section 1962(b); [or]
(iii) [by] conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering, Section 1962(c)" 7
(5) [that the plaintiff has suffered] an injury to his business or
property "by reason of' the aforementioned activity. 218
RICO's legislative history reflects concern over the infiltration of
legitimate businesses by "organized crime. "219 What vexes so many
in the application of civil RICO is not so much the language of the
statute itself but rather that text read in light of the stated purpose of
the statute: "the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate
commerce." 22' The courts have not thus limited its application but
have applied RICO to a wide variety of persons and situations not
envisioned by the enacting Congress.221 The future application of
RICO shows no signs of restraint.222
214. See JED RAKOFF, RIcO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY § 1.01, at 1-3
(1990).
215. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1997).
216. RAKOFF, supra note 214, § 1.02, at 1-8.
217. Id. at 1-8 n.1.
218. Id. at 1-8.
219. See id. at § 1.01, 1-3 (1990).
220. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
221. See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mutual Trading Corp., 63 F.3d 516, 522 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("The murkiness of RICO's parameters coupled with its alluring remedies have led
many plaintiffs to take garden variety business disputes and dress them up as elaborate
racketeering schemes.").
222. In a recent en banc decision, the Third Circuit stated "[w]e recognize that our ruling
means that RICO . . . may be applicable to many 'garden-variety' fraud cases .... [I]t is for
[Vol. 21:215
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Ostensibly, the case of National Organization of Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, was taken on certiorari in order to settle a dispute among the
circuits as to whether or not civil RICO required a showing of
economic gain or motive on the part of the RICO defendant." 3 The
Court held "that RICO contains no economic motive require-
ment.- 224  The plaintiff alleged that a coalition of antiabortion
demonstrators "conspired to use threatened or actual force, violence,
or fear to induce [health] clinic employees, doctors, and patients to give
up their jobs, give up their economic right to practice medicine, and
give up their right to obtain medical services at the [health] clin-
ics. -225
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Rehnquist for a
unanimous Court, admitted that RICO had been applied to persons
and situations not anticipated by Congress.226  Furthermore, the
Court stated that, notwithstanding the parties' submissions respecting
legislative history, nothing in the holding in Scheidler was contrary to
RICO's legislative intent.27 No reference is made in Scheidler to any
reports, debate records, or other materials which support the Court's
finding that the far-reaching implications of the Court's decision was
in no way contrary to the intent of the lawmakers who drafted the text
Congress to decide whether to narrow the scope of RICO." Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1296-
97 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
223. 510 U.S. at 255. The split was between the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Flynn,
852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 1988) ("For purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed
toward an economic goal.") and the Third Circuit with Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989) (because the predicate offense of conspiracy to extort
the plaintiffs Constitutional right to an abortion did not require economic motive, RICO requires
no additional economic motive).
224. Scheider, 510 U.S. at 262.
225. Id. at 263.
226. See id. at 260.
227. See id. at 261.
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of the law.228 This, the Court said, demonstrated "breadth" and not
ambiguity.2 2 9
The cases examined so far are all linked by a common
theme-focus on text and context. In textualism, interpretation of a
text involves textuality, textual structure, and textual context. Textual
context is internal linguistic context. 230  External context is the
cultural, political, and ideological background informing the text.
Textualist approaches seem to underscore Derrida's notion of "free"
play. In this sense, the cases and Derrida line up with the same school
of interpretation.
In the next section there is an overview of how the courts
misguidedly accuse Derrida of Humpty Dumpty-like reasoning.
Ironically, these courts self-indulgently assign their own Humpty
Dumpty meanings to words.
C. What Is "Contemptuousness?" The Case of In re Holloway231
In the case of In re Holloway, the issue was whether the assistant
public defender had intentionally and contumaciously ignored an order
of the court while examining an adverse witness.232 The entry of a
contempt order against the defense counsel, barring him from setting
foot in that courtroom (after the conclusion of that trial) and fining
him $1,000, was the relatively powerless defense counsel's price to pay
for what Judge Mikva in his dissenting opinion referred to as an honest
"misunderstanding" between counsel and the bench.23 3  Judge
228. Judge Mikva has said, of his own role as a former member of Congress, that he deeply
regrets the use of his own words as legislative history in the enactment of the civil RICO statute.
See Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 185 (1986).
When the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions of the
Organized Crime Act of 1970 came up for floor debate, I expressed my opposition in
hyperbolic terms, parading one horrible example after another before the House. Since
the managers had the votes, and I was speaking to an empty House, they didn't even
bother to answer me. My remarks have been used as legislative history ever since to
prove the broad scope of RICO. If I knew then what I know now (that was my first
term in Congress), I would have gone to the Committee Chairman and said that I had
36 members who were going to raise a lot of sand unless he agreed to engage in some
floor dialogue with me to limit future interpretations of the RICO language. At that
point he might well have agreed and I could have made the opposite-and less mischie-
vous-legislative history than I did.
Id.
229. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 262 (quoting from its decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
230. See Taylor, supra note 165, at 354.
231. 995 F.2d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
232. See id. at 1082-83.
233. See id. at 1096-97.
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Johnson presided over a six-defendant drug trial.234 The trial of the
criminally accused, Kelvin Roscoe, involved a charge of possession
with intent to distribute crack cocaine.235 Found in a bedroom with
his girlfriend on the second floor of a multidwelling building, Roscoe's
defense was that the crack belonged to his girlfriend, Tammy Felton,
and that she possessed the crack for her own personal use.236 In the
course of examining one of the police officers involved in the prosecu-
tion of Roscoe, counsel for the defendant attempted to weaken the
prosecution's case by exposing the police department's practice of
having two officers swear to a narrative of facts prepared by each
largely copied from the report prepared by the arresting officer.237
The arresting officer was the only person who had first-hand knowl-
edge of the facts surrounding Roscoe's "possession" of the drugs.2 38
The controversial document undoubtedly was triple-level hearsay
and the defense counsel sought to communicate that to the jury. Judge
Johnson refused to allow defense counsel to question the officer who
prepared the second statement, or to have him compare it to the third
sworn statement to show that the documents were copies of one
another.239 Counsel for the defendant and the court were speaking
at cross purposes when using the same word, "before." The court later
argued it intended "ever before."24  The judge believed counsel
understood that he could not question the witness about the document
if the witness had not seen the document until he was on the witness
stand.241 Defense counsel understood "before" in a narrower sense
to mean "before this examination." '242 If he showed the document to
the witness on the stand, then after showing it to him, he believed he
could question him about the document.243
234. See id. at 1081.
235. See id. at 1093 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
236. See In re Holloway, 995 F.2d at 1095.
237. See id. at 1082-83.
238. See id. at 1095 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 1083.
240. See id. at 1096 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 1084.
242. See id.
243. The transcript reads, in part, as follows:
Mr. Hollaway: Is Your Honor-just clarification as to what I can ask or not ask.
The Court: I have already told you the limits.
Mr. Hollaway: I cannot ask him to compare the two documents?
The Court: No, no, no.
Mr. Holloway: Why is that improper, Judge?
The Court: If this man has never seen that document before-and that's why I told
you you must ask him if he has seen that document, not just those paragraphs contained
on it-then he can't testify to it.
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In talking over each other's heads, defense counsel and the court
engaged in the following colloquy,
The Court: Excuse me, Mr. Holloway. The purpose of our last
bench conference in which I ruled on that legal question said that
the first thing you must do is determine whether he has ever seen
this document before, and his answer is no, he has not seen it before
today.
Was not that your answer?
The Witness: Yes, ma'am.
The Court: You may proceed.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: Do you know what that document is?
Mr. Christian: Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: If he has never seen it before, we are not going to ask
him if he knows what it is.
By Mr. Holloway:
Mr. Holloway: Well, can he look at it now? I mean, can he look at it now and
compare it.
The Court: He may not compare it until you have made certain determinations, Mr.
Hollaway. And I don't know how often I have to say that. That's the third time I have
repeated it.
(IN OPEN COURT:)
The Court: Mr. Young [the witness], if you will come back now, please.
By Mr. Hollaway:
Q: Sir: I'm showing you a document entitled "United States v. Kelvin Roscoe." It is
a document dated March 9, 1991.
The Prosecutor: Your Honor, he can identify it if he can recognize it.
The Court: He can say that. Go ahead.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: It is a document dated March 9, 1991. It is signed by Robert W. Condit, and it
has the number 91-0183 on it, and it has a pink paperclip. Would you look at this,
please.
The Court: He's asking you to look at it to determine whether or not you have ever
seen that document before.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: Have you had a chance to look at it?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: Okay. Do you know what that document is?
The Court: No, no, no. First of all, we must determine if he's ever seen it before.
That's the first step.
Have you ever seen that document before now?
Mr. Holloway: Judge-
The Witness: No, ma'am.
Mr. Holloway: Judge, I would ask the Court to allow counsel to complete his
examination.
See In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Appendix A) (emphasis added)
(transcript citations omitted).
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Q: Have you seen it now? Have you looked at it just now?
A: Yeah, I see it now.
Q: Okay. Having looked at it now, can you now tell us what it is,
what that document is?2.
As Judge Mikva said, it is not clear what the "preliminary determi-
nations" were on which Judge Johnson insisted. Obviously, from the
record, counsel reasonably assumed that if he was allowed to "proceed"
with questioning the witness after the witness had answered that he
had not seen the document "before," that he should rephrase his
question to establish "certain determinations." The Judge never
specified what those determinations were. Counsel understood"proceed" to mean you may proceed with the line of questioning aimed
at exposing the police department's practice of allowing officers who
have no personal knowledge of events to swear to statements prepared
by other officers. This understanding was reasonable in light of the
fact that the judge certainly knew that counsel had called this police
officer to the stand for the sole purpose of questioning him regarding
the preparation of the sworn to documents. In the judge's mind,"proceed" meant counsel could go on to pursue another line of
questioning, not dealing with the document. Accordingly, counsel then
asked the witness if he had seen the document "now." '245 The
witness answered affirmatively and no objection was entered.246
Counsel reasonably assumed he had met the judge's expectations of
establishing "certain determinations" and so continued with the
examination. "Okay, having looked at it now, can you tell us what it
is, what the document is?" '247 Immediately following this question,
the judge summarily entered the contempt order.24
As is illustrated in In re Holloway, a misunderstanding between
the judge and counsel can have disastrous results for the criminal
justice system. Given the speaker's miscommunications, defense
counsel requested that the court allow him to withdraw from represent-
ing Roscoe in this trial on grounds of effectiveness.249 The judge
denied his request (and did not think of recusing herself) with the
following tautological reasoning,
244. Id. at 1090-91 (emphasis added).
245. See id. at 1091.
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 1091-93.
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He will only be found in contempt of court if his conduct is
contemptuous. All of us can be contemptuous from time to time,
and that is the only way that he or any other lawyer in this city will
ever be found in contempt of court by me is if they are contemptu-
ous. As long as Mr. Holloway is not contemptuous, he has not one
thing to worry about, and he knows that. He knows what the law
is with respect to contempt, and he knows that unless he behaves
contemptuously, there is no possible way for him to be held in contempt
of court.250
The judge's behavior is very Humpty Dumpty-like-"contemptuous
means what I say it means." It was clear to United States District
Court Judge Norma Johnson that what she meant by contemptuous
was contemptuous. Her judicial conduct placed counsel in the
dangerous position of having to take a stab at questions first then have
the "contemptuousness" of that question reviewed. The appeals court
(in its majority view) conflated this bizarre approach with deconstruc-
tion.2 '
What is the lesson this case imparts? That as humans suffering
from an imperfect system of communication, misunderstandings are
unavoidable. In his scathing dissent, Judge Mikva attacks the majority
for forgetting this basic understanding, that the duties of court
"inevitably create tremendous conflict and tension between the court
and counsel, and misunderstandings borne of impatience and frustra-
tion are commonplace."2"2 Instead, the majority refers to the "Der-
rida-like" efforts of the defendant-appellant and amici to interject
ambiguity into the judge's directions."5 3
D. What Is "Final"? The Case of Rodriguez v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services254
In Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Judge
Perez-Gimenez tackled what Congress meant by a "final judgment"
within the meaning of the Application for Attorney Fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),255 in light of recent Supreme
Court cases dealing with disability benefits.25 6 The court said,
250. Id. at 1092 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
251. See id. at 1084.
252. In re Holloway, 995 F.2d at 1097.
253. See id. at 1084.
254. See 794 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1992).
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1985).
256. See Rodriguez, 794 F. Supp. at 59.
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Mr. Hernandez's reading of the relevant case law is counter-
intuitive. In essence, he argues that a court's order which may
engender further proceedings-including reconsideration of the
same-is a final judgment. This position is evidently untenable.
While deconstructionists like Jacques Derrida contend that language is
inherently equivocal, the illogical interpretation of statutory and
procedural requirements is rightly disfavored. 7
By the terms of the Administrative Law Judge's opinion, additional
judicial review (and action) could be taken up until sixty days
following the computed date of receipt of the judgment by the
plaintiff' During this time the judgment would still be subject to
motu propio review by the Administrative Council." 9 Until the
expiration of this period, the judgment, noted the court, would not be
"final."26  The debate in this case then centered around the
comparison of the words in the Disability Act allowing the district
court to take action on an administrative judgment, the words
contained in the district court's order, and the possible intentions of
the court extrapolated from the foregoing language read together.261
According to this court, all three funds of evidence pointed to the
meaning "not final. ' 262  The court did what many courts did-show
that the weight of "evidence" favored its interpretation and dismissed
the losing side's argument as untenable. If the advanced interpretation
could not be "contended" then why did the court bother to prepare a
memorandum opinion explaining that the motion was "illogical,"
"counterintuitive," and "untenable"?263  There must have been
something tenable, at least on its face, to the lawyer's argument or the
court should have summarily denied the motion.
VI. CONCLUSION
As is demonstrated in this Article, judges cast their role as one of
pathfinder and arbiter in a challenging but palpable exercise of
applying established rules to disputes between people. It is a heroic
257. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
258. See id. at 61.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 59-60.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 60. Denial of applications for fees based on "finality" of judgments do not
generally require that the court provide reasons for the disposition of the application. Cf. FED.
R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment order must recite the reasons for the disposition) and FED. R.
CIV. P. 65 (injunctive relief orders require same).
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role. The role of the philosopher is not nearly as significant or relevant
to real (tractable) problems. In this manner, a judge is not far from a
calculating machine. Precisely computing the correct answer, if only
the correct data is placed in his hands. Cassandra-like Derrida is not
the kind of data or material a judge can use. Apparently whatever it
is that Derrida has said or is saying might lead to changes in the way
law (caselaw or otherwise) is made. As this Article demonstrates,
many legal thinkers (judges included) are and have been aware of the
powerful relationship between context and text and the position of the
reader, author, and interpreter of language. Debates over the many
possible meanings of language and intentions embedded in text and
their significations on a legal terrain will, in all likelihood, continue.
As subjects (in the object sense) of culture and society, every
person is, no doubt, contaminated by the order within which he or she
functions. Derrida suggests that each person consider looking outside
this order. If deconstruction has been attacked as irresponsible, all
persons would indeed be irresponsible not to question the legitimacy
of whatever forms guide them even if they do not know where the path
will lead.
[Vol. 21:215
